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 THE NEW YORK MONEY MARKET
 Two characteristics of the New York money market must at
 once attract the attention of the observer familiar with the
 money markets of Europe. There is in New York no single bank
 holding the reserves of the other banks of the city itself and of
 the country generally, and taking that lead in times of financial
 difficulty, which inevitably must be assumed by a central
 reserve bank. There is a large number of banks of varying
 size almost all of which, judged by European standards, are of
 small capital and engaged in business of comparatively in-
 significant prop ortions. These characteristics of themselves
 render a clear understanding of- the New York money market;
 difficult for those not directly concerned with its daily opera-
 tions, and that difficulty is greatly enhanced for the -foreign
 student in consequence of the complex monetary system of the
 IUnited States and of the variety of legal arrangements under
 which banking is carried on. Besides private banks and
 financial houses, there are three distinct groups of incorporated
 banks-national banks, state banks and trust companies. The
 national banks work under the provisions of the national
 banking law, the most comprehensive system of banking law in
 the world. The state banks are chartered under the somewhat
 less rigid laws of the State of New York and the trust companies
 are also under state laws of a distinctly less stringent character
 so far as their purely banking operations are concerned. There
 are in New York city forty-two national banks, forty-two
 state banks and thirty trust companies. State banks may be
 passed over with a few words of explanation. With three
 exceptions they are all small banks and all are engaged
 in an almost purely local business. Useful to the trade and
 industry of the city itself, they may be disregarded in a study of
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 New York as a great financial centre.1 Some of these banks
 make large advances in connection with Stock Exchange dealings
 in a manner not permitted to the national banks by the certifica-
 tion of checks for brokers who at the time have not an equivalent
 deposit to their credit. The banks are in effect making loans
 of a very teimporary nature upon personal security alone.
 These cheques are used in payment fbr stocks which on delivery
 can be used to secure the loan, if the obligation is not ex-
 tinguished by cheques received by the broker in the course of
 current business. During periods of active speculation, when
 an increasing volume of these cheques is being drawn and paid
 day by day, the danger of heavy loss is very great, but since the
 introduction in 1894 of the Stock Exchange Clearing House for
 active stocks the demand for such accommodation has been
 much reduced. The magnitude and character of the business
 of the trust companies require more detailed consideration, but
 for the present we may devote our attention exclusively to the
 national banks which are in every respect the most important
 of the financial institutions of the city.
 The commanding position of the national banks of New
 York is primarily the result of their position as depositories of
 the reserves of other banks, not only of the city, but of the
 country generally. New York is in a sense the central clearing
 house for the entire country. Settlements are there made for a
 multitude of transactions representing business dealings which
 have their origin elsewhere, and all European exchange opera-
 tions, for Canada as well as the United States, are there con-
 ducted. All banks of any importance throughout the country must
 have some bank as their agent in New York, and must have a
 sufficient deposit there to be able to provide customers at any
 moment with means of payment in New York. The conveni-
 ence and necessity of an account with a New York bank to
 banks in other parts of the country had given the banks of that
 city the position of reserve banks long before the national
 banking system was organised in 1863. The custom was
 fully recognised in that system, and unquestionably the force
 of the existing tendency was greatly strengthened by the
 provisions relating to reserve of the national banking law.
 The present law requires country banks to hold a reserve
 1 The total resources. of the state banks on September 12, 1901, amounted to
 $262,000,000, capital and surplus together were $32,000,000, loans $144,000,000,
 deposits $190,000,000, and cash $43,000,000. Annual Re.port of N. Y. State Banks,
 p. 214.
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 of 15 per cent. of their deposits, three-fifths of which may
 consist of a deposit in a "reserve city." Cities with a popu-
 lation of 50,000 may become reserve cities upon application of
 three-fourths of their banks. Banks in reserve cities must keep a
 reserve of 25 per cent., one-half of which may be held in " central
 reserve city" banks. Cities with a population of 200,000 may
 become central reserve cities on application of three-fourths of
 the national banks there established, and banks in such cities must
 bold a reserve in their own vaults of 25 per cent. A country
 bank then may deposit either in a reserve or central reserve
 city bank, and the reserve city bank in a central reserve city
 bank. There is a large and increasing number of reserve
 cities, twenty-eight at present, whereas of central reserve cities
 there are but three, New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. Of these
 last New York holds bankers' deposits many tim-es larger than
 those held in the other two cities. On September 30, 1901, the
 New York banks were indebted to other national banks for
 $205,000,000, those of Chicago and St. Louis together for but
 $69,000,000.1 In addition the New York banks owed to State
 banks the sum of $68,000,000, and to savings banks and
 trust companies $99,000,000. The leadirng position of the
 New York banks is shown even more clearly if we analyse
 the total reserve of the national banks of the country: 3,885
 country banks against deposit liabilities of more than
 $1,500,000,000 held a total reserve of $429,000,000, of which but
 $134,000,000 was in cash in their own vaults. The 275 banks in
 reserve cities against deposits of a little more than $1,000,000,000
 held a reserve of $291,000,000, of which $131,000,000 was in
 cash. The 61 central reserve city banks against deposits of
 nearly $1,100,000,000 held a reserve in cash of $276,000,000, of
 which $207,000,000 was in New York against deposit liabilities
 of $794,000,000.2
 It will be observed then that for the banking system as a
 whole there exists but one large store of cash, that held by the
 New York banks. In this very important respect, the only
 difference between the banking system of the United States anid
 I These, as well as other statistics relating to the national banks, are taken
 from the annual report of the Comptroller of the Currency. These reports, in two
 yearly volumes, contain an immense variety of data concerning the banks of the
 United States.
 2 The 5 per cent. fund deposited at the United States treasury for the redemp-
 tion of banknotes is counted as a part of the required reserve. It has no very
 great significance, however, since the total for all the banks amounted, at the above
 date, to but $16,000,000.
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 those of European countries lies in the distribution of that
 reserve among many banks. The decentralisation of reserve is,
 however, by' no means so great as might be supposed to judge
 from the number of national banks in New York city. These
 bankers' deposits, though large in the aggregate, -would give to
 each bank a somewhat insignificant amount if they were divided
 with anything like equality among all the banks. But not 'all of
 the banks hold bankers' deposits; some of the national banks,
 like the state banks, confine themselves to a local business, and
 among those which seek to attract the accounts of' outside banks
 there is active competition. Interest is offered for such deposits,
 usually at the rate of 2 per cent. The New York banks also
 grant facilities for the business of country banks, and accommoda-
 tion in the way of loans anid re-discounts. Some banks have
 naturally been much more successful in attractinig these deposits
 than others. In 1901 nine banks held, of such deposits, less than
 $1,000,000 each, ten banks less than $2,000,000, and six banks
 between $2,000,000 and $8,000,000; making a total for these
 .twenty-five banks of but $35,000,000. Nine other banks held
 between $8,000,000 and $20,000,000, with a total of $95,000,000;
 and eight banks, each with more than $20,000,000,1 held a total
 of $295,000,000. Out of a total of $425,000,000 of bankers'
 deposits, the seventeen larger banks held $390,000,000.2 These
 seventeen banks may properly be regarded as the- reserve banks
 of the couuitry. Their position is 'increasingly important since
 they are acquirinig year by year a larger share of the business of
 holding banlkers' deposits. T4is is particularly true of the six or
 eight most important banks. These deposits give them the use
 of large sums of money in addition to that furnished by their
 capital, surplus, and undivided profits, which for the seventeen banks
 in 1901 amounted to $56,000,000 and to $67,000,000 respectively,
 out of a total capital for all the banks of $70,000,000, and
 surplus and undivided profits of $93,000,000. In respect to
 these items 'there has been during recent years a notable
 increase in the New York banks as a whole,3 and during
 the last ten years there has also been some decrease in the
 number of banks. In 1891 there were forty-nine banks, while at
 These figures are of the gross bankers' deposits; those on p. 32 were of net
 deposits.
 2 The National City 'Bank alone, with $60,000,000 of such deposits, held as
 much as twenty-eight of the smaller banks.
 3 The National City Bank has recently increased its capital from $10,000,000 to
 $25,000,000 and its surplus from $7,000,000 to $15,000,000; increases not included
 in the above figures.
 No. 49.-VOL. XIII. D
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 present there are but forty-two. The decrease has taken place
 in most instances through the consolidation of two or more
 banks in order to form one large institution. This movement
 would probably go much further but for the provision of the
 national banking lftw against branch banking. On account of
 this obstacle, there has been a noticeable movement towards
 greater unity of control and management through the purchase
 of a controlling interest in several banks by different groups of
 capitalists.
 The position of the more important New York banks is
 entirely analogous to that of the great central reserve banks of
 Europe, sucb as the Bank of England and the Bank of France.
 Any unusual demand for actual cash, either for domnestic pur-
 poses or for export, is certain sooner or later to bring about a
 withdrawal of money from the New York national banks. In
 Europe responsibility for reserve is ceintralised, and the policy to
 be adopted to protect the reserve is irn the hands of one body of
 directors; in New York- the reserve is scattered among a
 number of banks, and the responsibility is therefore divided.
 On the surface this scattered responsibility might seem to
 render any uniform policy almost impossible of attainment.
 The withdrawal of cash mnay not be felt equally by all the banks,
 and consequently the policy to be adopted may not meet the
 approval of many boards of directors acting upon different
 information and under varying degrees of necessity. In times
 of crisis a device has long been in use, which secures unity of
 action; I but in times of only moderate stringency the same policy
 may not always be followed by all of the banks. All banks do
 not shorten sail at the same time. While some banks are curtail-
 ing discounts, other banks may be seizing the opportunity to
 extend their businiess. On the whole, however, it would be
 difficult to show from actual occurrences in recent years that
 this splitting up of responsibilitv has been a serious source of
 weakness. The conditions to which the operations of banking
 are subject in New York are well understood by those directly
 concerned, and the working at cross purposes is apparently
 no greater there than in European cities between the large
 reserve banks and the other banks. There is no doubt greater
 friction in the ordinary workings of the New York money market,
 but it may properly be ascribed to conditions forced upon the
 banks by the national banking law and the general monetary
 1 See p. 49.
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 system of the United States, conditions for which the banks
 are in no way responsible.
 Before entering upon an analysis of the conditions to which
 the market is subject, a digression is necessary to make clear the
 position of the bank note. All national banks may issue notes
 to the amount of their capital on the deposit of an equivalent
 value at par of government bonds at Washington. The position
 of the New York banks as reserve banks has not, therefore, like
 -that of the European banks, been brought about in any measure
 through the monopoly of note issue. It would be the same
 if no banks whatever were allowed to issue notes. It may
 further be said that the note issue has absolutely no effect
 upon the working of the New York market, and that in every
 essential respect it would be what it is if no notes at all
 were issued. The present note issue is much more akin in its
 mode of circulation and in its effects to a government issue of
 paper money than to a bank note issue as it is ordinarily
 understood. The chief factor determining the increase or decrease
 of the notes is the price of government bonds. The notes
 increase when the price falls quite xegardless of anything else,
 just as government issues increase in response to government
 needs and without relation to business demands. Even in case
 of an acute demand for actual cash, when notes would be as
 readily accepted as gold, the time required for taking out new
 circulation, from four to six weeks, is such as to preclude any
 general resort to that expedient. In ordinary times all banks pay
 out all notes, their own and others, without distinction, selecting
 notes from the various kinds of monev, gold, silver and legal
 tender notes received in the ordinary course of business, because
 the bank note cannot be counted as a part of the legal reserve.
 On September 30, 1901, all the banks of the system held but
 $26,000,000 of lnotes of other banks out of a total circulation of
 $353,000,000, anid the New York banks held but $725,000 of such
 notes-in both cases an amount probably representing the notes
 -which had been received in the course of the day's business.
 The notes form a permanent part of the circulating medium in
 every day use. If they were absent altogether there would un-
 questionably be a larger amount of gold in the country, just as
 would be the case if the government issues of paper money were
 retired. The banks would in that case doubtless hold a larger
 proportion of gold than they do at present since the preference
 of the-people for paper money for every day use would probably
 D 2
This content downloaded from 128.163.2.206 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 20:44:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 36 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 absorb all of the government paper issues, a part of which
 flow rests in the vaults of banks constituting a portion of their
 reserve.
 In respect to note issue the New York banks are in 'a position
 very similar in many ways to that of the Bank of England.
 There are many purposes for which bank notes are as service-
 able as gold, some sort of money which will pass readily from
 hand to hand is often required and deposit accounts against
 which cheques are drawn will not serve the puirpose. IHioliday
 demands in England may be mentioned as a familiar example.
 Such demands are met by the withdrawal of either coin or notes
 from the Bank of England. It matters little which is drawn
 out, since in either case the reserve is reduced. In France a
 similar demand would not reduce the reserve unless it were for
 coin. A demand for notes would simplv increase the deml-and
 liabilities of the Bank of France and reduce the percentage of re-
 serve, but of course much less than an equal withdrawal of coin.
 In New York, and for the country as a whole, a demand for money
 for every day use involves a reduction of bank reserves. Con-
 ceivably banks might keep a stock of bonds to secure an
 emergency or temporary circulation, but clearly such a system
 would not be profitable for the banks. Temporary demands for
 cash are in fact inet from funds on hand, usually in paper money
 without much discrimination as to the particular variety. In
 any case the reserve is reduced and that is the matter of import-
 ance for the banker. The inelasticity of note issue is a source
 of much greater difficulty in the United States than in smaller and
 more tbickly settled countries like England, where cheques can be
 used for a larger proportion of businfess purposes. In a very
 striking way the difficulties which result from an inelastic cir-
 culating medium are illustrated every autumn when there is
 always an unusual demand for money to "move the crops."
 Crops of corn, wheat and other cereals in the West, and of
 cotton in the South, are, in large part, bought by dealers during
 September and October. Farmers require payment very largely
 in cash to pay labourers and frequiently for their own use where,
 -as often happens, they have no account with a business bank.
 To meet-this deimand banks in the South and West draw oi
 their reserve agents who may, of course, be once or twice
 removed from the reserve banks of New York city. But this
 demand for cash is simply transferred from agent to agent and
 most of it comes sooner or later upon the reserves in New York.
 In the course of two or three months the money will have passed
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 from the banks to the dealers, from them to the farmers, then
 into the hanlds of those from whom the farmers and their
 labourers make their purchases, and thence into the local banks.
 By the end of January most of it will have returned to New
 York. This transfer of cash to and from the West and South
 goes on every year; it is a regular demand similar to that
 which is every year met in Scotland by an increase of notes. It
 is somewhat more prolonged in the United States on account
 of the greater extent of territory and because the various crops
 are not harvested at exactly the same time.
 The reserve regularly begins to fall shortly after the middle of
 August. The withdrawal of cash is at its height in September,
 and this adverse teildency, though less marked, continues as
 a rule to the end of November. The outward movement
 is particularly strong at the end of September, because then
 the movement of the cotton crop is being completed, and
 that of the cereal crop is well under way. Late in October
 money may begin to flow back froml the South, but a greater
 quanltity is still going out to the West. As a rule, gold exports
 are unusual at that period of the year. Exchanige is drawn
 against cotton and cereal shipments made or expected, and
 almost invariably gold is imported from Europe. From forty to
 sixty inillions may be regarded as a fair estimate of the amount
 withdrawni from New York for crop movemenit purposes, but the
 effect oni reserves is usually somiiewhat neutralised not onlly by
 g-old imports, but by the deposits of Eastern bainks. The reverse
 movemilenit, slow and uncertain in December, becomes pronounced
 with the beginniiig of the year, and by the middle of February
 reserves have reached the midsumlmer level. Year by year the
 return movemen-t seemiis to be more and more postpolned.
 The con-sequence of this movemiient of currency away from
 New York, is a stringent nmoneymarketnearly every autumn, which
 can only be avoided by keeping a large supply of idle cash on
 hanid during the rest of the year. In view of the temporary
 nature of this drain and of its domestic character, it might be
 thought safe to allow reserves to be reduced for the time being
 without any restriction of accommodation in New York, relyinig
 uponl the return of cash at the end of the year to restore the
 depleted reserves. A reduction of the reserve of a similar nature
 at the Bank of England is regarded as having little importance,
 and does not lead to a rise in the rate of discount such as would
 follow an even smaller outflow for export purposes. In the
 United States the autumnl demilaild for currency extends over a
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 period of months rather than of weeks, anid in New York,
 moreover, the legal requirement of a reserve of 25 per cent.
 is a serious obstacle. All decreases of reserve are alike, from
 the point of view of the requirement of the legal reserve, and if
 moD.ey is going out, the only steps open to the banks are the
 restriction of loans, and the increase of rates for money, in order
 to attract gold imports. It is clear that this legal provision
 must often be the cause of dear money in New York, when with-
 out such a provision, and without curtailing discounts, banks
 would simply trust to the course of events to strengthen their
 position. A reserve which may never be used even for emergen-
 cies, might seem to rest upon a complete misunderstanding of
 banking principles. More properly it may 'be regrarded as an
 illustration of the inevitable difficulties in the way of legal
 restraints designed to secure safety in so complex and elaborate
 a miechanism as the machinery of credit. In one way, of
 course, the banks might free themselves from this difficulty.
 They are inclined at all times to extend their credits close
 to the legal requirement, thus rendering necessary curtail-
 ment in some direction when unusual dema-nds are made
 upon themn for cash. For banks in the position of those in New
 York a reserve much larger than 25 per cent. would seem to be
 advisable at all times, If the banks were accustomed to keep a
 reserve well over 30 per cent., there would be a large mnargin for
 withdrawals before miieeting the rigid wall of the legal requirelmlenlt.
 At tinmes the desirability of such a policy has been discussed,
 but the banlis have never miiade any serious efforts in that
 direction. It is a matter -in which action is difficult on accouilt
 of the number of banks in the system. In order to reap any
 gain from the use of the bankers' deposits upon which they are
 paying initerest, the banks must lend at all times very close to
 the limit allowed by law, and particularly when rates for money
 are low. Herein is found one of the most certain advan-
 tages of the central reserve systemii of a single bank. The Bank
 of England, paying no interest oii deposits, can with an equal
 profit keep a much higher percentage of cash agaiinst its deiimand
 liabilities.
 Absolute rigidity is fortuiiately not iinsisted upoil in the law.
 Banks whose reserve is below the legal requiremenit are merely
 warned bythe Comptroller of the Currency to increase their reserve
 within 30 days. Failure thereafter may lead to the winding up of
 the banik; a step it may be added not very likely to be taklen
 where the failure to mainltaini reserve is due to general causes
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 and not to the negligence of the managers of a particular banlk.
 Throughout July and August, during the crisis of 1893, the
 reserves of the New York banks were continuously below the
 minimum, falling at one-time to less than 21 per cent. Similarly
 in 1899 the reserve for three weeks was below the line, and
 naturally when the average is close to the line many individual
 banks will be considerably below the required limit. On the other
 hand, the 25 per cent. ininimum is not a simple dead letter. The
 banks make every effort to keep within the required limit.
 Custom of many years is strong and public opinion everywhere
 regards a smaller reserve as a sign of weakiiess, and unless
 curtailment of loans will bring about acute distress the banks
 follow that policy, at the same time raising rates for loans,
 particularly rates for call money.
 The absence of branch banks in the national banking system
 adds to the difficulties which must be met by the reserve banks.'
 In a country having so wide a variety of conditions and oc-
 cupations as the United States, among the 4,000 or more national
 banlks it must often happen that when many demands are made
 upon some banks, and when they are consequently withdrawing
 money from their city agents, other banks will find themselves
 with an abundance of cash, more than is required for current
 ineeds. Under a branch system of banking, money would be
 readily transferred from those branches where it was not needed
 to the central bank. Even under the present system, as a
 rule, the transfer is remarkably rapid. The interest given
 by the reserve banks is amply sufficient to brinlg about the
 deposit of funds nlot actually required. In the course of a crisis,
 however, the case is altered. Then the desire to strengtheni the
 reserve at all costs is strong, anid many banks withdraw money
 which they do not actually need, thus accentuating the acuteness
 of the disturbance in reserve cities and particularly in New York.
 Another source of difficulty is due to the independent
 treasury system of the United States. Receipts and payments
 are made through the United States treasury at Washington and
 through various sub-treasuries in all of the rmore important
 cities. If government receipts and expenditures were well
 balanced, this system would be but a temporarily disturbing
 factor during those weeks or months in the year when the income
 of the government was comin-g iln most rapidly. But in the United
 1 In a few States the state banks may organise branches, but comparatively
 little use has been made of this liberty. New York City state banks may establish
 branches within the city limlits.
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 States there is far less approximation to equality of inflow and
 outgo than iii most other countries. This is partly due to the
 fact that one chief source of revenue is customs duties, but it is
 even more largely because appropriations are made with little refer-
 ence to probable revenue. Particularly in periods of prosperity,
 receipts are likely to exceed expenditures, and just at the time
 when banks find the most active demand for loans, the govern-
 ment will be locking up week after week money which is largely
 drawn in last analysis from the New York banks. During the
 fiscal year ending June 1901, governm'ent receipts exceeded
 expenditures by $77,000,000, and for the following year the
 excess was $92,000,000. There are several ways in which these
 withdrawals are returned to the market. Government funds
 may be deposited with the banks on the security of an equal par
 value of government boilds deposited at Washington. In this
 way $93,000,000 of governiment money was held in Juile 1901,
 and nearly $120,000,000 in June 1902. Money thus deposited
 is expected to be left for a considerable period, and this resource
 can only be regarded as an outlet for large permanent accumula-
 tions. It may be added that there is little profit to the banks in
 this transaction when 2 per cent. bonds are selling at a premium
 of 8 to 10 per cent.' Bond purchases for the sinking fund are
 made by the governmenit, as a rule, at those times when lack of
 money is most severely felt. This method is certainly very
 effective to meet temporary periods of great stringency
 and is often combined with the prepayment of interest on
 gQyernment bonds. Purchases for this purpose were miade
 during the fiscal year 1901 amounting to $36,000,000, and
 for 1902 to the amount of $56,000,000. It will be readily
 seen from the foregoing that financial difficulties in the
 New York market must often be the result of unsatisfactory
 conditions wlich can hardly be overcome by bankers, and which
 could be very easily done away with by changes in legislation.
 A third cause of change. in bank reserves is due to exports
 and imports of gold. Withdrawal of gold is usually met by the
 presentation of legal tenders at the New York sub-treasury in
 exchange for gold. The gold does not, as a rule, come directly
 from the banks, but of course the legal tenders do come from
 the banlks and reduce the reserve just as if the gold itself
 were taken directly. Until recent years withdrawals of gold
 1 The larger city banks are often in sufficiently good credit to borrow bonds
 from large holders for this purpose. $14,000,000 out of the $35,000,000 of bonds
 deposited by the New York banks were acquired in thiis way.
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 have always been the cause of uneasiness in the New York
 market. This uneasiness was not due to a fear that the banks
 themselves were in an unsound condition, and in no position to
 withstand a strain upon their reserves. It was the result of the
 slight foundation of gold upon which the great mass of govern-
 nlent money rested, both silver and legal tender notes, as well as
 the fear of the direction, which future monietary legislation
 might take. It has not been sufficiently realised that such
 difficulties are less and less likely to occur in the future. Si'nce
 the repeal of the Sherman law in 1893 there has been no appreci-
 able increase in the volume of either silver I or greenbacks. The
 greenbacks have remained stationary since 1878 at $346,000,000,
 the silver coinage, taking both that coined under the Act of 1878
 and that of 1890, amounts to $570,000,000. In 1893 the currency
 of the United States was certainly redundant, and gold was accord-
 ingly forced out of the country. In recent years, however, the
 demands Qf an increasing population and greater business have
 absorbed the silver issues for everyday purposes; the country
 has grown up to its supply of domestic money and even grown
 beyond that supply. But aside from bank notes, the only kind
 of money capable of increase is gold. The volume of bank notes
 has increased somewhat,2 but the supply of gold has increased in
 much greater degree. Between 1896 and 1901 the 'stock of gold
 in the country is estimated to have increased from $600,000,000
 to over $1,100,000,O000.3
 This increase of gold clearly places the currency of all sorts
 in the Uniited States upon a much sounder basis, to say inothing
 of the increased demand for the paper and the silver in every-
 day transactions. Its effect is clearly shown in the character of
 the inoney forming the New York bank reserves. In 1896 the
 gold holdings of the New York banks were about $50,000,000,
 in 1901 they were nearly three times as great, amounting
 to $149,000,000. Of silver in 1896 there was less than
 $6,000,000, in 1901 $15,000,000; of legal tenders $57,000,000 and
 1 The coinage of the bullion purchased under the provision of the Sherman
 Law of 1890 involves a slight increase of the silver currency.
 2 The Currency Act of 1900 increased the amount of notes to be issued against
 the par value bonds from 90 to 100 per cent. and, in other ways, made the issue of
 notes, for the time, more profitable. In the course of the following year and a
 half the volume of notes increased by rather more than one hundred millions, but
 since that time notes have been withdrawn as rapidly as the law will permit, i.e.,
 $3,0(0,000 a month.
 3 Both estimates are certainly too large, but of the amount of the increase
 there is less doubt.
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 $49,000,000 at these two dates. Very nearly all the increase in the
 reserve has been through additions to the stock of gold, and the
 same has been true of the reserves of the banks for the country
 as a whole. The stock of gold in the United States treasury
 has also at the same time so greatly increased that withdrawals
 of gold in the fuature are altogether unlikely to affect the ability to
 meet without difficulty any demands which the obligations of the
 existing monetary system place upon the government of the
 United States.
 This increase in the supply of gold is oftell overlooked by
 foreign observers, who chiefly notice the movement of gold to
 and from. New York. Alimost all the gold which leaves the
 United States goes from New York, but a very large part of the
 gold which enters the country comes to ports on the Pacific
 coast. During the six years from 1896 to 1902 gold exports
 from New York amounted to $263,000,000 and imports to
 $225,000,000. The total gold exports of the country, however,
 were but $308,000,000, as against total imports am-ounting to
 $458,000,000, the excess of imlports at San Francisco alone
 amounting to $96,000,000. Gold which enters the country by
 way of the Pacific coast is almost immediately available in New
 York, it beinog deposited in San Francisco in exchange for drafts
 on the sub-treasury in New York. To this increase in the stock
 of gold froiim sources outside of the country, there must be
 added the yearly product of the country itself, which durinlg
 recent years has runl well above $70,000,000. It will thus be
 seen that a more or less chronic miiovement of gold away fromii
 New York mnay take place without involving any weakening of
 the basis upon which the currency of the country rests; and
 that in fact gold exports of themselves fromii that city, apart from
 their temuporary effects, have little or no significance.
 Knowledge of the actual position of the New York market
 at any time is largely based upon the returns con-tained in
 the Weekly Bank Statement issued every Saturday. This
 statement containis returns of the condition of all the clearing
 house banks, of which there are at present fifty-nine-forty-two
 nlational banlks and seveniteen state banks. The returns for each
 bank are published, anld frolm those returns a statement is made
 up of the conditionl of all the banks. This stateluent, however,
 is nlot of the condition of the banks at any one mllomenlt; it
 represenits the average for the six preceding days of business.
 Sometimes, therefore, the statement taken by itself miiay be
 somewhat imisleadinlg. If, for examiiple, large withdrawals of
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 cash take place late in the week they will not be fully represented
 in the returns. Such a statement is spoken of as one based on
 falling averages. Similarly the return may be one based on
 rising averages, when loans have been largely reduced at the end
 of the week involving a consequent decrease in deposits, or
 when there has been a considerable inflow of money. The
 following is the return for the week ending July 26, 1902:
 OOO's omitted.
 Difference fr omn
 previous week.
 Capital ... . ..,, ......... 100,072
 Surplus ........... ................... 114,387 -
 Loans and Discounts ............ 913,294 Increase 9,957
 Circulation . .................. 31,997 188
 Net Deposits . . 952,097 11,404
 Specie ...... .. 174,136 ,, 967
 Legal Tenders . ........ . 79,390 ,, 1,676
 Reserve held . ....... ... 253,526 2,644
 Required Reserve ..... . 238,024 ,, 2,851
 Surplus Reserve . ........... , 15,602 Decrease 206
 The changes of the week can be in part explained from the
 return itself and from other accessible data. The increase of
 $11,400,000 in deposits is in large degree the result of the
 increase of nearly $10,000,000 in loans, which are only slightly
 accounted for by the very small increase in circulation. The
 larger fluctuations in the deposit account are almost invariably
 due to similar fluctuations in loans and are a most striking illus-
 tration of the fact so often overlooked, that deposits are much
 more largely the result of credit advances than of mioney actually
 paid into ba,nks. The further unexplained increase in deposits
 of rather more than $1,500,000 is more than accounted for by the
 increase of $2,600,000 in specie aind legal teniders-a discrepancy
 perhaps due to the average system, or to changes in minor items
 such as stocks and bonds not included in the weekly statement.
 During the week in question the banks had received from the
 interior $8,300,000 and had shipped $4,500,000, these operations
 showing a niet gain for the banks of $3,800,000. With the sub-
 treasury the dealiings of the week showed a net loss of $2,000,000,
 the result of both movements being a net gain for the banks of
 $1,800,000. The increase of the reserve was $8,000 in excess
 of this amount, a gain to be accounlted for by the average systellm
 or by local movements of cash in the city itself. During this
 week gold exports amounted to $2,600,000, which was with-
 drawn from the treasury in exchange for legal tenders. In con-
 clusion, it will be observed that although there was an increase
This content downloaded from 128.163.2.206 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 20:44:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 44 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 in the actual reserve held, the surplus reserve on account of
 the large increase in deposits was somewhat less thaii on the
 previous week.
 The conditions peculiar to the New York money market
 increase greatly the chances of wide fluctuations in the demand
 for cash incidental to every central reserve mioney market.
 Banks so situated must exercise great caution and their loans
 must be of an unusually liquid character lest the resources of
 the banks, however good in the long run, be so placed as to be
 unavailable. For banks so conditioned call loans are everywhere
 regarded as the most satisfactory form of investmeent. Call
 loans are chiefly of service in conniection with operations on the
 stock and other exchanges. The existence of large funds which
 may be borrowed on call is a necessary prerequisite for such
 dealings, anid the presence of such funds more than any other
 single factor gives New York increasing pre-eminence in the
 United States in that class of dealings. Not only do the grow-
 ing bankers' deposits in New York provide an increasing fund
 for call loans, but a larger proportion of the business of the New
 York banks seems. to be taking that direction. In part this
 seems due to changes in business methods. The integration of
 related occupations, which is a common feature of many of the
 more recent industrial combinations, reduces distinctly the demanid
 for advances against comimercial paper representing the sale of
 goods by one group of producers to another. Moreover, largely
 oni account of improvements in transportationi and of other
 ilmeans of commiiilunication, the period between the purchase of
 goods by retailers and their sale to consumers has been con-
 siderably shortened. Stocks of goods carried by dealers are
 smaller, and consequently the amount of credit advances in
 connection with such business has diminished. The following
 table of classified loans of the New York niational banks brinlgs
 out very clearly this tendency during recenlt years:
 1890. 1896. 1901.
 On deeniand .......................... $102,000,000 $110,000,000 $279,000,000
 On time secured by collateral ......... $43,000,000 $69,000,000 $129,000,000
 On time against commercial paper.. $152,000,000 $144,000,000 $203,000,000
 All classes of loans have increased, but those on commiercial
 paper less rapidly than demanld loans or time loans. Time loans
 represent in part advances in conniectioni with stock exchange
 dealings, and very largely advances, in connectioni with the forma-
 tion and floatation of new coiipaniies.. The rate for time loans
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 is generally somewhat less than that on commercial paper, and
 such loans are consequently preferred for general business
 purposes.
 In any market call loans are subject to very wide fluctuations
 on account of the nature of stock exchange dealings, in connec-
 tion with which the demand for money varies greatly in amount
 and in degree of urgency. For reasons already pointed out rates
 for call loans might be expected to fluctuate more widely in
 New York than in other great markets. Onle cause of variation
 in the demand for call money present in London and continental
 cities is absent in New York. Settlements on the New York
 stock exchange are daily, not fortnightly, as is the rule elsewhere.
 Stocks are usually delivered and paid for on the day after their
 purchase. The day to day demand for loans will vary with the
 volume of each day's business, but there is no such accumulated
 demand from time to time as comes on other exchanges working
 under the system of fortnightly settlements. On the other hand,
 in New York the requirement for loanis is more immediate, and
 failures sometimes occur from lack of time to make necessary
 arrangements to overcome difficult situations. In the call loan
 market rates are subject to wide fluctuations, for another reason
 quite apart from the particular nature of the banking organisa-
 tion of the country. Speculation in the United States has, upon
 the whole, been more unrestrained than in other countries, in
 large measure a consequence of the rapid development of a new
 country, in which the possibility of sweeping changes and of
 large gains is much greater than in an older country where con-
 ditions change but slowly. The closest analogy to Amaerican
 conditions, which is found on European exchanges, is in invest-
 merits in certain groups of foreign securities. Notable instances
 of unchecked speculation in such securities tend to show that
 with simiiar conditions like movements will result on any
 exchanige. Movements, which in England are confined to a few
 classes of securities, have extended in the United States to very
 nearly the entire list. Moreover, until very recently the stocks
 and bonds bought and sold in the New York market have been
 without exception American securities. A few foreign securities
 are now regularly listed on the stock exchange, anad their number
 seems likely to increase. This widening of the market mnay well
 be expected to have a steadying effect. Financial difficulties in
 New York have frequently been made more acute through the
 return of American securities held abroad, thus rendering more
 difficult atteimlpts to check the export of gold. In the future
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 unfavourable foreign exchanges may perhaps be reversed by
 the withdrawal of American capital invested in other coun-
 tries.
 Rates for time loans and for commercial paper do not seem
 to be subject to greater extremies than similar rates in other
 markets. It does indeed somiietimes happen that the national
 banks greatly reduce their advances of time loans and parti-
 cularly their discounts of commercial paper; the entrance of
 out of town banks into the market as purchasers of commercial
 paper is at such times not infrequent. When rates for such loans
 are high in New York, banks outside the city find it profitable to
 enter the market either because rates at home are low, or, as
 often happens, because there is no local market for all of their
 funds. It sometimes happens that the New York banks with-
 draw entirely from the market for such loans except for regular
 customers without any very great increase in rates, or serious
 diminution of advances for. general business purposes.
 * The requirements of the market are also largely supplied by
 the trust companies whose powers of extending credit are
 unchecked by any legal restraints. The bankiing operations of the
 trust companies have of recent years come into general notice.
 Trust companies were originally formed for the purpose of ad-
 ministering trust funds and estates either under will or generally.
 The powers granted to them by their charters were wide, and
 placed no obstacles in the way of a general banking business. This
 business was entered upon at first probably as a mere coniveni-
 ence in connection with the business for which they were
 primarily organised. It was soon seen, however, that the trust
 companies had certain advantages over the banks in liberty of
 action owing to the absence of legal restrictions. Trust
 companies have accordinlgly been for-med in many instances
 primnarily and even exclusively for the purpose of engaging in
 banking, and banking has become an increasingly large part of
 the business of very nearly all of them. In New York in 1901 the
 trust companies had a total capital of $37,000,000, with surplus
 and undivided profits of $85,000,000, while the deposits subject
 to cheque amounted to $566,000,000, an amount nearly two-thirds
 that of the nationial banks.' It should be noted that a larger
 proportion of these deposits than in the national banks are to
 the credit of persons not engaged in active business and are
 rather in the nature of savings bank deposits. In a measure
 I Some of the trust companies return both trust and general deposits together,
 and accordingly, the amount given for deposits in the text is sQmewhat too large.
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 also the loans of the trust companies are not in the field of the
 national banks. Mortgage investments forni an important part
 of their dealings, as well as loans of a long time nature upoIn
 other securities. After all deductions lhave heen made, however,
 there remains a large and increasing part of their business which
 competes directly withi the banks. The total of loans on
 collateral and oni personal sec-arity, including commercial paper,
 amounted in 1901 to $497,000,000. The reserve of the trust
 companies is, with few exceptions, entirely deposited, with the
 national banks. In 1901, $89,000,000 was thus deposited, while
 cash on hand amounted to but $6,800,000, and of this some
 $6,000,000 was held by three companies, leaving all the other
 companies, with deposits of $482,000,000, but $745,000. The
 advisability of larger reserves actually held by trust com-
 panies has been at times discussed; but the general situation,
 the arguments in favour and the obstacles deferring action,
 closely resemble those affecting the London joint stock banks.
 If any actionl is taken it will come either through legislationi
 designed to place the trust companies on the same footing as the
 banks, or from the banks themselves through the clearing-
 house.' By far the larger part of the loans of the trust
 companies are made against collateral securities. In the call
 loan market they compete constantly with the banks, and are
 said to take a larger proportion of the total of those loans
 than of time loanis. Direct discounts of commercial paper are
 forbidden to them by law, but lending on1 such security is
 accomplished by direct purchases of commercial paper from
 note brokers. These purchases, always conlsiderable, vary
 .greatly in amnount, rising when the resources of the national
 banks are fully absorbed in other directions. The transfer of
 loans from the banks to the trust companies is a common practice
 when the reserves of the banks are getting low, and then the
 weekly bank statement may show a heavy reduction in loans, and
 consequently in deposits, without involving any real reduction in
 the total of credit advances.2 Transfers of loans are facilitated
 through the close relationship between individual trust companies
 and individual banks. Where, as often happens, the same names
 appear on the directorate of a bank and of a trust company there
 1 A rule has recently been proposed by the clearing house banks requiring a
 reserve of 5 per cent. from all trust companies; a reserve which will gradually be
 increased to 10 per cent.
 2 Weekly reports of the condition of the trust companies are made to the
 clearing house associatioD, but they are not published.
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 can be no doubt that both institutions work together with a
 common policy.,
 Another feature of the New York market which in the last
 few years has become more prominent requires attention,
 although it is a matter on which no definite conclusion can be
 reached. The directors and chief owners of many of the more
 important banks are not primarily bankers. Their chief interests
 are in railroads and in the larger industries of the country-coal,
 iron, oil, copper, sugar and the like. Banks are important to
 them not as a source of profit from dividends, but as a con-
 venience in carrying on their various outside dealings. In this
 respect there is a striking contrast with 'the London joint stock
 banks, the controlling influences in which seem to be much more
 exclusively purely banking influences. How far this difference
 really involves a difference in the nature of the business of the
 banks in the two cities, and in their relative strength and solidity,
 no one except those actively engaged in business in both cities
 can form a satisfactory judgment. From time to time more or
 less well authenticated rumours appear conlcerning arrangements
 favourable to various syndicate operations which might be re-
 garded as undesirable judged by conservative financial standards.
 The most that can be said with certainty at present is that the
 financing of some large speculative enterprises is probably
 somewhat more easy in New York than in London.
 In the absence of a central controllinig reserve bank some
 unity of action among the banks has been brought about through
 the clearing house association. The clearing house is composed
 of the forty-two national banks, seventeen state banks and the
 United States sub-treasury. The other banks and the trust com-
 panies clear through some member bank. Aside from rules
 governing clearing house operations and the requirement of weekly
 reports of condition from all the banks, member and non-member,
 little has been done in the direction of common rules until recently,
 except in time of crisis. The rule mentioned above with refer-
 ence to the reserve of trust companies and the system of uniform
 charges for collection of out of town cheques may be mentioned
 as recent instances of clearing house action.
 No analysis of the New York market would be complete
 which failed to consider the mechanism which has been devised
 to meet the exigencies of a financial pallic. All experience
 shows that the sole remedy in the midst of a crisis is the con-
 1 For an interesting article on the New York trust companies, see Political
 Science Quairterly for June, 1901.
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 tinuance of advances by banks. In a central reserve system
 the inecessity devolving upon the reserve bank to continue to
 lend is well understood and followed without exceptionl.
 Where there is no central -reserve bank acting also as the
 centre for the clearings of other banks, the situation is not so
 simply dealt with. If some banks continue to lend they
 must face the prospect of an unfavourable balance against them at
 the clearing house in favour of the banks which restrict their
 advances, and-will day by day see their stores of cash diverted to
 the banks which are doing nothing to relieve the situation. In
 New York this difficulty has been completely met by the device
 of the clearing house loan certificate. On the security of stocks
 and bonds deposited at the clearinig house, a bank receives
 certificates which it may use at the clearing house in case of an
 unfavourable balance. The bank which continues to lend loses
 nio cash, and the banks which restrict advanlces do not thereby
 increase their stock of money. It ceases to be to the advantage
 of any bank to pursue the policy of satuve qni peut. Practically,
 for the tinme being, the reserves of all the banks are comn-
 bined, and are now subject only to reduction through the
 actual withdrawal of money by individual customers or demands
 from other parts of the country. This device, resorted to in
 every emergency since 1860, has sometimes comnpletely relieved,
 the situation, and always has been of very great assistance eveni
 wheni the difficulties were too general and deeply rooted to be.
 entirely overcome.'
 The working of the New York mooney market was most
 strikingly illustrated during the last six months of 1902, a period
 of financial stringency, but not complicated with general
 economic disturbanice. Business in almuost every direction had
 been phenomenally active and prosperous for several years, and so
 conitinued during the six months under consideration. Through-
 out the country there was a great demand for capital which was
 naturally reflected in advancing loans and expanding credits, as
 shown by deposit accounts; while the reserve of banks every-
 where was uniusually close to legal requireiments. In these
 circumstances the autumnal withdrawal of money from. the New
 York banks might well have been expected to be unlusually
 heavy and prolonged. Nevertheless, in that city no apparent efforts
 were nlade to husbanid resources and build up reserves. The
 demand for loans there was strong, not only for general comn-
 I For a detailed account of the issue of clearing house loan certificates at
 differenit times, see Dunbar, Chapters on Banking, Ch. VII.
 No. 49.-voL. XIII. E
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 niercial purposes and stock exchange dealings, but also in
 connection with industrial and railway combinations. Few
 new arrangements of the latter kind were being entered upoin,
 but a number of important " deals" had still to be carried to
 completion. It was well known, also, that a decided check had
 been experienced in the sale to the general public of the vast
 mass of securities which had been created during the previous
 'three years. Underwriters were heavily burdenied with these
 stocks, which-they were carrying largely upon loans secured both
 in Europe and in the United States. Armerican indebtedness in
 Europe, in the form of permanlent investments, had certainly
 been greatly reduced through the sale to New York of America-n
 securities formerly held abroad; but the temporary indebtedness
 of New York bankers in London, Paris, and Berlin was of
 enormous proportions, being commonly estimated at about
 $300,000,000. Increasing imports anid decreasing exports, the
 natural consequence of the high level of prices prevailing in the
 United States, had recently reduced by. nearly one-third the
 favourable trade balance. In the autumiin of 1901, instead of
 European gold imports, rnormal at that time of the year,
 $20,000,000 was exported; and evenl with the most favourable
 harvests there was little likelihood that more foreign bills would
 be created thanl would be required to pay for imports anld a part
 of the temporary loans above menationed. Increasinig imports
 also involved large customs payments, which fall more directly
 upon the New York banks thani do other government receipts.
 Between February and August the Treasury had absorbed nearly
 $30,000,000 from the ordinary channels of trade.
 In these circumstanlces caution, if not absolutely necessary,
 was certainly to be desired. Nevertheless, during July and the
 first half of August, a speculative movement, unusually active
 for the titme of year, took place on the stock exchange. Rates
 for call loans were not advanced, and the total loanls of the
 clearinig house baniks increased, between Junie 28 and August 16,
 from $893,000,000 to $925,000,000; at the same time the surplus
 reserve above the 25 per cent. requiremelnt fell from $13,000,000
 to $7,000,000. Theni at last began the inievitable reductionl of
 loanis, which by September 20 stood at $887,000,000. But
 meanwhile withdrawals of money had reduced the reserve to
 $220,000,000, a loss of $20,000,000 which turned the surplus
 -reserve into a deficit of $1,642,000. Inl the course of the
 following week loans were further reduced by $12,000,000, with
 anl allmlost equivalenit decrease of deposit liabilities; which
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 brought it about that, while actual reserve changed but little, a
 reserve surplus of $3,000,000 was secured. Rates for loans of
 all kinds had rapidly advanced. Commercial discounts at 6 per
 cent. were IS per cent. higher than in August, anld were niot easily
 procured. Except for regular customers, the New York banks
 were out of the market for commercial paper, and high rates
 continued to the end of the year. Nevertheless, we may conclude
 that discounts were not greatly contracted, since outside banks,
 at least in part, took the place of the New York banks, and
 since no important business failures occurred.
 The effects of stringency were felt much more severely in
 conn.ection with stock exchange dealings and by those engaged in
 company flotations. The reduction in the amount of both time
 and call loans was probably greater than in the amount of
 discounts, and certainly the advance in rates for this class of
 accommodation was greater and produced more definite results.
 The rate for sixty-day time loans moved upward from 4 per cent.
 early in August to 6 per cent. after the middle of September,
 with a commission of from i to 1 per cent. added; and even at
 that figure were bard to get, since the banks were disinclined to
 lose control of money for long periods. Call loan rates showed
 the widest fluctuations, reaching 20 per cent. before the middle
 of September, then falling below 6 per cent., and rising to 35 per
 cent. before the end of the month.
 The immediate effect of advancing rates in New York was to
 cause a fall in foreign exchange to about the specie importing
 point. Early in September $4,000 000 was engaged in Australia,
 arriving in October, and $4,500,000 was imported from Europe;
 but a considerable part of the latter was the result of a special
 transaction, and not an ordinary exchange movement. No
 further imports occurred, however, to the end of the year. On
 the contrary, rates of exchange soon moved in the opposite
 direction, and gold exports seemed almost certain to take place
 throughout the autumn, while further advances of money rates in
 New York appeared to render withdrawal muore immninent. For a
 long time distrust of the general economic situation in the
 Uniited States had been apparent in Europe. It was felt that
 too much floating capital had been locked up in connection with
 industrial and railway coimibinationls, and the danger of a complete
 collapse in the value of securities was thought not imiiprobable.
 When, therefore, the situation became acute in New York, anid
 higher rates for mloney cauLsed liquidation and a fall in the value
 of stocks, the maturing foreign loans were renewed with difficulty,
 E 2
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 anid the payment of a part of them was required. Moderately
 high rates might in such circumstances prevent gold exports,
 but very high rates and general restriction of loans would have
 been almost certain to bring about gold exports upon a large
 scale. The market had, therefore, to extricate itself from its
 difficulties by the aid of domestic resources alone.
 Durinig Septemuber the Treasury had absorbed a further suImi
 of $7,000,000, although several efforts had been made to get rid
 of its accumulations.' On September 29 call loans were at 35
 per cent., and the liquidation in stocks threatened to assumue
 unmanageable proportions. On that day, rather unexpectedly,
 the Secretary of the Treasury came to the assistance of the
 mnarket. By a somewhat strained interpretation of the national
 banking law, two entirely novel expedients were author-
 ised. Banks were not to be required, as hitherto, to carry a
 reserve against government deposits, which, it will be rememn-
 bered, are specifically secured by the deposit of an equivalent
 amount of government bonds. Government deposits at this
 time aluounted to about $130,000,000, of which $40,000,000 was
 in New York. This expedient was not looked upon with favour
 by the banks in New York. The clearing house did not rescind
 its own rule requiring a reserve of '25 per cent., anid the only result
 was a separation in the bank statement of the two kinds of
 deposits. The substitution of certain state anid municipal bolnds
 as security for governmeint deposits was also authorised. These
 bonds were to be taken at 65 per ceint. of their par value, the
 remaining 35 per cent. to be still filled by governmenit bonids.
 This substitution was to be allowed only on condition that the
 government bonds thus set free were to be used to take out
 further circulation. In the course of the autumn somiie
 $20,000,000 of state and municipal bonds were substituted, and
 about. $13,000,000 of government bonlds were thus secured as a
 basis for further note issue. This device was chieflymade use of
 by banks in leading cities, and, with other bonds, the circulation
 of bank notes was increased by $19,000,000 betweeni September
 15th and November 25th. In New York alonie circulatioin was
 increased by about $10,000,000, chiefly during the last two weeks
 I On September 13th, the prepayment of October interest, amounting to
 $4,500,000, was announced, and further deposits of government money in the banks
 were arranged, which restored to the banks a similar amount. On September 25th
 the prepayment of interest to July, 1903, at a discount of -2, per oent. was
 annouinced, and oni the following day the government offered to purchase 5 per cent.
 bonds of 1904 at 105, but this price was so unsatisfactory that only $25,000 was
 offered.
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 of October.1 The government bonds must be replaced before
 August, 1903, and since the banks are unlikely to purchase a
 further supply of bonds, some retirement of circulation will be
 brought about.
 Neither of these expedients was received with general
 approval, not because they involved risk to the government but
 becausethey seemed to be possible only under what, to say the least,
 was a somewhat strained interpretation of the national banking
 law. Nor was the positive assistance thus given very great,
 except in its effect upon general sentiment. The opinion also
 found expression that the stringency was purely aln affair of
 certain banks, private bankers, and speculators, and that govern-
 ment intervention was neither deserved nor required. Whether
 deserved or not, the indirect effects upon general business of a
 general stockmarket panic are sufficient to render any aid within
 legal limits proper from the point of view of public policy. The
 novel expedients of the Secretary of the Treasury, moreover,
 only deferred resort to the same method which had commonly
 been pursued under like circumstances by previous Secretaries-
 the purchase of government bonds.2 During the first two weeks
 of October the reserves of the banks underwent little change,
 receipts from various sources serving to balance the continued
 outflow of money to the West and South. On October 17th the
 government announced its willingness to purchase its 5 per cent.
 bonds of 1925 at 1373. A preliminary arrangement had been
 made with a syndicate of bankers and bond houses, which agreed
 to furnish a large block of bonds at this prieo, which was
 certainly favourable to the government. Bonds requiring the
 payment of $16,000,000 were at once received, and that amount
 of money was immediately transferred from the Treasury to the
 banks, the reserves of which during the week advanced from
 $221,000,000 to $238,000,000, and a week later stood at
 $244,000,000.3 By means of the bond purchases, increase of
 bank notes, additions to government deposits, and imports of
 gold, the amount of molley in circulation and in the banks, for
 the country as a whole, was at the end of October $60,000,000
 1 Early in the summer the Secretary had induced many large banks to make
 preliminary arrangements, such as printing and the like, so that circulation might
 be taken out quickly if once determined upon.
 2 Purchases had been discontinued early in the year on the ground that the
 price of bonds was being forced up, and that banks were withdrawing circulation in
 order to sell their bonds to the government.
 3 Between October 17th and Novermber 8th, the period during which this offer
 was open, $22,800,000 was paid for $16,800,000 of bonds.
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 greater thaln at the beginning of the month. At the same tiiime,
 $25,000,000 had been added to the reserve of the New York
 banks, which now had a surplus reserve of $21,000,000. From
 the same causes the total of money in circulation was increased
 by $16,000,000 during the month of November, but the New
 York banks lost $15,000,000 through the continued movement
 of money away from that city. The outgo, in fact, continued to
 the close of the year, when reserves stood at $223,000,000. With
 the beginning of the new year a rapid return movement began,
 and on January 24th the reserve had advanced to $254,000,000.
 The prolongation of the crop movement period was in large part
 due to the. widespread prosperity in agricultural sections of the
 country. Cotton and cereal growers are able to hold out for
 higher prices much longer than used to be the case. On the
 other hand, high prices during the autumn checked foreign pur-
 chases, and therefore the supply of bills of exchaiige drawn upon
 Europe was until December smaller than might have been
 reasonably expected. Early in that month $2,000,000 was sent
 to Argentina on English account, but later in the month exchange
 at length fell far below the export point.
 One consequence of the new devices of the Secretary of
 the Treasury at the end of September was to greatly relieve the
 general situation, although the stock of money held by the banks
 was not increased. Rates for call loans fell to about 6 per cent.
 and liquidation on the stock exchange ceased. In fact, a new
 speculative movement was started by a group of speculators, a
 novement which sheds not a little light upon American financial
 conditions. Early in the summer this group of irresponsible
 speculators purchased control of a majority of the stock of the
 Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and an alarming situation
 confronted the more conservative interests controlling the two
 other important railway systems of the Southern States. The rail-
 road was bought at a high price, and payment took place early in
 October. With this money an upward movement in stocks was
 started, to be, however, soon sternly checked by the banks, which
 at length had determined upon a more decided policy. Rates for
 loans were advanced, loans were restricted, and those which
 seemed designed for further speculation were refused. During
 the week ending October 18th, loans were reduced by $9,000,000
 to $865,000,000, the lowest point of the year. The increase in
 reserve which followed the government purchase of bonds was
 followed in turn by a reductioni of money rates to a point little
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 above the normal level, but the amount of loans was not greatly
 increased, and there was no further upward movement in stocks
 to the enld of the year. Liquidation in the stock market con-
 tinuied, and values of shares generally fell off until the end of
 November, though slowly and in such a manner as niot to produce
 anything in the nature of a panic, aud there were no failures of
 any general significance.
 Early in December the possibility of another period of acute
 stringency was recognised. The withdrawal of gold for South
 America, already mentioned, was thought to be the possible
 beginning of heavy gold exports; money was still going to the
 interior of the country, and the close of the year was cer;tain to
 lock up funds in connection with dividend payments. Rates for
 loans were again advanced, and further liquidation and depression
 of values seemed imminent. On December 13th a " money pool "
 was therefore formed, comprising most of the leading banks of
 the city. The most important firm of private bankers and seven
 of the national banks subscribed for $5,000,000 each; one bank
 for $2,500,000; two bianks for $1,000,000; and several other banks
 for the remainder. The effect of the announcement of this
 arrangement was immediate, and no necessity arose to call upon
 the committee in charge of the pool for assistance. In some
 quarters the ability of the banks to lend this additiornal amount
 without a further supply of money was questioned. The effect-
 iveness of such an arrangement becomes evident, however, when
 it is compared with the operation of the clearing house loan
 certificate. Each bank that came into the pool subscribed
 a sum roughly proportional to its ordinary call loan dealings.
 Had all of the $50,000,000 been borrowed, it would have raised
 by that amount the deposits of the banks, thus increasinlg the
 volume of cheques to be clea.red, but not greatly altering the
 balances to be paid by the banks. The proportion of reserve to
 deposits would have been diminished, but in something like equal
 proportions among all the banks.
 These occurrences in the New York money market make
 clear both its weakness and its strength. That a difficult
 situation was handled skilfully and adroitly is evident; but one'
 cannot but feel that so much skill and adroitness ought not to be
 necessary. In fact those who were responsible sailed altogether
 too near the wind; no balancing of forces could have saved the
 situation had there been poor harvests of cotton and wheat. A
 decided absence of coniservatism is evident, due in large part to
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 the fact that most of the leading banks are not independent
 entities. They are inextricably drawn into arrangements for
 carrying through vast operations in which their directors are not
 only interested but the controlling factors. In these circum-
 stances it is not unlikely that the periodic check to expansioll of
 credit which comes every year through the withdrawal of money
 to the interior is of the greatest service. An elastic currency
 (note issue) is now generally advocated by bankers in order to
 prevent the recurrence of such difficulties each autumn. Had
 such a system prevailed, it is indeed possible that during the
 period just reviewed everything would have gone well, that credit
 advances would not have been contracted, and that all the various
 engagements entered upon both in the United States and in Europe
 would have been met without difficulty. On the other hand, the
 possibili-ty is probably greater that optimistic forecasts would
 have been accompanied by the formnation- of further combinations
 and further expansion of credit, until speculation and advancing
 prices were ruthlessly cut down through the curtailment of
 foreign loans and the export of gold in large quantities.
 The independent Treasury system of the United States,
 however, is clearly from every point of view ain unmixed evil.
 The banks will never depend entirely upon themselves while
 millions of dollars are in the Treasury certain to be disbursed,
 according to some plan or other, if the general financial situation
 becomes critical. It is entirely unlikely that any Secretary of
 the Treasury will ever absolutely decline to return government
 money to the banks, whatever the cause of the difficulty may be.
 Just before an election he may take the initiative. Were
 government funds deposited entirely with the banks all the time,
 a more conservative policy would be adopted at once; and if it
 were not, it would be forced upon the banks after a single
 experience of the difficulties which would otherwise arise. Not
 only does the fiscal system of the government relieve the banks
 of the necessity of depending entirely upon themselves; but also
 it obscures the causes of monetary difficulties. The withdrawal
 of money by the Treasury during the first nine months of 1902
 was the reason commonly advanced in explanration of the
 situation during the autumn months. The total of those with-
 drawals amounted to but $37,000,000, surely an insufficient
 cause for the later difficulties; and the amount returned to the
 market during October was far more than had been previously
 absorbed. Fundamental causes of weakness are thus obscured
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 or but lightly touched upon, alnd the necessity for a change in.
 the policy of the banks is not clearly seen. Evils due to existing
 banking law are alone recognised, and imnprovement througlh
 banking legislationi is given too exclusive attention, both by
 bankers anid the general public.
 0. M. W. SPRAGUE
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